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1 Introduction
In a standard search-theoretic model of the labor market (see, e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides
1994), agents make two decisions: rms decide whether to open a vacancy in order to hire an
additional worker, and rm-worker pairs decide whether or not to break up in order to let the
worker seek employment elsewhere. The rmsdecision to open a vacancy trades o¤ the upfront
cost of recruiting with the delayed benet of employing an additional worker. The rm-worker
pairsdecision to break up trades o¤the upfront cost of foregone wages and prots with the delayed
benet of higher wages, once the worker nds a better job elsewhere. Both of these decisions are
investments, in the sense that they trade o¤ an upfront cost with a delayed benet.
As all investments do, the rmsdecision to open a vacancy and the rm-worker pairsdecision
to break up are sensitive to the rate at which agents discount future payo¤s relative to current
payo¤s. Specically, if the rate at which agents discount the future increases, rms will open
fewer vacancies and rm-worker pairs will become more reluctant to break up. The decline in
the number of open vacancies will tend to lower the tightness of the labor market and, in turn,
the rate at which unemployed workers become employed (the UE rate). The tightening of the
conditions under which rm-worker pairs break up will tend to lower the rate at which employed
workers become unemployed (the EU rate).
In this paper, we formalize the argument above and examine its implications for the hypothesis,
put forward by Hall (2017), that cyclical uctuations of the labor market might be caused by shocks
to the rate at which agents discount the future. In turn, shocks to the discount rate may be caused
by changes in agentspreferences for the timing of consumption (Eggertsson and Woodford 2003),
they may be caused by changes in the expected growth rate in the marginal utility of consumption
(Hall 2017), or they may be caused by changes in an exogenous debt constraint (Kehoe, Midrigan
and Pastorino, 2019).
We consider a search-theoretic model of the labor market in the spirit of Menzio and Shi (2011).
In the model, rm-worker matches are heterogeneous, in the sense that di¤erent matches have a
di¤erent quality. Firm-worker matches are experience goods, in the sense that their quality is ini-
tially unknown and it is discovered on the job. The model has rich predictions, in the sense that
the rate at which unemployed workers become employed (UE rate), the rate at which employed
workers become unemployed (EU rate), and the rate at which workers move from one employer to
another (EE rate) are all determined endogenously. Workers move from unemployment to employ-
ment when they nd a vacant job. Workers move from one employer to another employer, as they
try to move from low to high-quality matches. Workers move from employment to unemployment
when the quality of their match turns out to be low enough. The search process by which rms
and workers come together is directed by the terms of the employment contracts o¤ered by rms.
In the rst part of the paper, we characterize, analytically, the e¤ect of a discount rate shock.
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We nd that an increase in the discount rate lowers the tightness of the submarket visited by
unemployed workers, i.e. it lowers the ratio between the number of vacancies that o¤er the wage
demanded by unemployed workers and the number of unemployed workers. For this reason, an
increase in the discount rate lowers the UE rate. We also nd a necessary and su¢ cient condition
under which an increase in the discount rate lowers the reservation quality of a rm-worker pair,
i.e. it lowers the productivity level below which a rm-worker pair nds it optimal to break up.
If and only if the condition is satised, an increase in the discount rate lowers the EU rate. The
condition is simple and intuitive: The di¤erence between the rate at which a worker nds a new job
when unemployed and the rate at which a worker nds a new job when employed at the reservation
quality must exceed the arrival rate of an idiosyncratic shock to the quality of a match.
In the second part of the paper, we characterize, quantitatively, the e¤ect of a discount rate
shock. We calibrate the model to the US labor market, using data from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP). In particular, we calibrate the model to match the average UE, EU
and EE rates, as well as the relationship between the EU and EE rates and job tenure. For the
calibrated version of the model, we nd that the necessary and su¢ cient condition under which
an increase in the discount rate increases the EU rate is satised. Using the calibrated version of
the model, we measure the response of the labor market to an increase in the discount rate from
4 to 10%. We nd that the UE rate falls by 3.5%. The EU rate falls by 3% on impact and, over
time, reaches a level that is about 6% lower than before the shock. The unemployment rate barely
moves, as the decline in the UE rate is o¤set by the decline in the EU rate.
Our theoretical and quantitative ndings highlight a serious challenge for the hypothesis that
labor market uctuations are driven by discount rate shocks. In response to a discount rate shock,
the UE and EU rates move in the same direction as they are both manifestations of investment
decisions and, hence, they have o¤setting e¤ects on unemployment. Empirically, though, the UE
and EU rates move in opposite directions at the business cycle frequency and, hence, they both
contribute to unemployment uctuations. The hypothesis of labor market uctuations driven by
aggregate productivity shocks does not su¤er from this problem. Using the same model, we nd
that, in response to a 5% decline in aggregate productivity, the UE rate falls by 10%, the EU
rate increases by 20%, and unemployment rises by 30%. Intuitively, the UE and EU rate move in
opposite directions because a negative productivity shock lowers the rmsbenet from employing
an additional worker and lowers the rm-worker pairsopportunity cost of breaking up.
In the last part of the paper, we show that our ndings are robust to alternative specications
of the environment. First, we consider a version of the model in which the search process is
random. As in the baseline model, we nd that a discount rate shock generates a counterfactually
positive comovement between the UE and EU rates. Second, we consider a version of the model
in which the quality of a new match is known and evolves over time, either according to a jump
process or according to a continuous Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Again, we nd that a discount
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rate shock generates positive comovement between the UE and EU rates. Third, we consider a
lifecycle version of the model in which workers accumulate human capital on the job. Intuitively,
when workers accumulate human capital on the job, the value of a rm-worker match becomes
more backloaded and, thus, more sensitive to changes in the discount rate. We nd that, at the
aggregate level, an increase in the discount rate lowers the UE rate and raises the EU rate, as in
the data. However, an increase in the discount rate still generates a counterfactual decline in both
the UE and EU rates for older workers, as the return of experience on human capital for older
workers is low. More importantly, a shock to the discount rate shock generates responses in the
UE and EU rates that are much larger for younger than for older workers, while in the data the
UE and EU rates display very similar uctuations across di¤erent age groups. The homogeneity
of the cyclical volatility of UE and EU rates across groups for which the return of experience
to human capital is very di¤erent (i.e. young and old) is another challenge to the high discount
hypothesis.
The contribution of our paper is to use a rich search-theoretic model of the labor market to
revisit the hypothesis that labor market uctuations might be caused by shocks to the discount
rate. The rst to put forward the high discount hypothesis was Hall (2017), who pointed out that
the same shocks to the discount rate that are needed to rationalize the uctuations of the stock
market also rationalize the uctuations in unemployment.1 Hall (2017) makes this point using the
search-theoretic model of the labor market by Pissarides (1985), a model where the only choice is
the rmsdecision of how many vacancies to open and, hence, the only endogenous outcome is the
UE rate. Here, we use a model in which not only the UE rate, but also the EU and EE rates are
endogenous because di¤erent rm-worker matches have di¤erent quality. The model belongs to a
large class of on-the-job search models that have been successfully used to explain the pattern of
transitions of workers across employment states (see, e.g., Burdett and Mortensen 1998, Postel-
Vinay and Robin 2002, Baggers et al. 2014) and, more recently, have been fruitfully used to study
aggregate labor market uctuations (see, e.g., Menzio and Shi 2011, Lise and Robin 2017, Baley,
Figuiredo and Ulbricht 2020). By using a richer model, we can derive additional predictions of
the high discount hypothesis. One of these predictions namely that the UE and EU rates would
comove over the business cycle is clearly counterfactual.
Our paper also engages Kehoe, Midrigan and Pastorino (2019), a prominent follow-up to Hall
(2017). Kehoe, Midrigan and Pastorino (2019) point out that, if workers accumulate human capital
on the job, the e¤ect of discount rate shocks on the UE rate is magnied.2 Using a version of our
1Kaplan and Menzio (2016) propose a model that simultaneously generates a decline in the stock market and
an increase in the unemployment rate.
2Kehoe, Midrigan and Pastorino (2019) use a search-theoretic model in which workers are heterogeneous with
respect to their human capital. In their model, the UE rate is endogenous. The model also generates an endogenous
destruction of rm-worker matches. However, since all the matches between a worker with a given human capital
and a rm are identical, when a worker leaves a match he does not enter unemployment (as he has no reason
to search for another match that is the same as the one he just left). Rather, the worker exits the labor force.
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model with human capital accumulation and an explicit lifecycle structure, we nd that a positive
shock to the discount rate generates a large decline in the UE rate and a large increase in the
EU rate. At a disaggregated level, the shock generates much larger responses in the UE and EU
rates of younger workers than in the UE and EU rates of older workers. Moreover, the shock still
generates positive comovement of UE and EU rates for older workers. While the rst prediction
is consistent with the cyclical behavior of the US labor market, the second and the third are not.
We do not view our ndings as nal evidence against the hypothesis of high discounts. We view
our ndings as insights on some problematic aspects of the existing versions of the high discount
hypothesis, which may direct future research on the subject. A version of the high discount
hypothesis that might be consistent with the cyclical behavior of both UE and EU rates is one in
which discount rates a¤ect the cost of some inputs of production. For example, Eckstein, Setty
and Weiss (2020) consider a search-theoretic model in which rms need to hire workers and rent
capital in order to produce. They show that an increase in the rental rate of capital3 lowers the
net income generated by a rm-worker match and, hence, it causes a decline in the UE rate. Since
an increase in the rental rate of capital lowers the income produced by a rm-worker match, just
as a decline in aggregate productivity does, we would expect it to also cause an increase in the
EU rate.
2 Theory
In this section, we propose a search-theoretic model of the labor market to understand the e¤ect
of uctuations in the rate at which agents discount future income. Firm-worker matches are
heterogeneous, in the sense that di¤erent matches have a di¤erent quality. Firm-worker matches
are experience goods, in the sense that their quality is initially unknown and it is discovered on
the job. The model has rich predictions, in the sense that the UE, EU and EE rates are all
determined endogenously. Workers move from unemployment to employment when they nd a
vacant job. Workers move from one employer to another employer, as they try to move from low
to high-quality matches. Workers move from employment to unemployment when the quality of
their match turns out to be low enough. As in Menzio and Shi (2011), the search process by which
rms and workers come together is directed by the terms of the employment contracts o¤ered by
rms. Using this model, we derive conditions under which an increase in the discount rate leads
not only to a decline in the UE rate, but also to a decline in the EU rate.
Therefore, their model does not endogenize the EU rate.
3Eckstein, Setty and Weiss (2020) assume that the increase in the rental rate of capital is caused by an increase
in the cost of nancial intermediation. In this sense, theirs is a model of nancial intermediation shocks rather
than high discounts. It would be easy, though, to modify their model to make the increase in the rental rate of
capital emerge from an increase in the rate at which agents discount future income.
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2.1 Environment
The economy is populated by a measure 1 of workers. Every worker maximizes the present value of
income discounted at the rate r(!), where ! denotes the state of the aggregate fundamentals of the
economy. When a worker is unemployed, his ow income is b, where b represents a combination of
unemployment benets and value of leisure. When a worker is employed, his ow income is some
w, where w represents the wage received by the worker from his employer. A worker permanently
exits the labor market at the rate   0. A ow of new workers with measures   dt enters the
labor market during any interval of time of length dt.
The economy is also populated by a positive measure of rms. Every rm maximizes the
present value of prots discounted at the rate r(!). A rm operates a constant return to scale
production technology that turns the labor input of one worker into a ow y(!)z of output, where
y(!) is a component of labor productivity that is common to all rm-worker matches, and z is a
component of labor productivity that is idiosyncratic to a particular rm-worker match. We shall
refer to z as the quality of a match.
The labor market features search frictions. A rm searches for workers by maintaining vacant
jobs at the ow cost k > 0. An unemployed worker searches for vacant jobs with an intensity
normalized to 1. An employed worker searches for vacant jobs with an intensity of   0. The
process that brings searching workers and searching rms together is directed by the terms of
trade. Specically, for each of its vacant jobs, a rm chooses the lifetime income x that it will
deliver to a worker hired for the job. Searching workers choose what lifetime income x to seek
from a job. Then rms o¤ering the lifetime income x and workers seeking the lifetime income x
meet bilaterally. A worker seeking the lifetime income x, nds a job at the Poisson rate p((x)),
where (x) is the ratio between the measure of workers seeking x and the measure of vacancies
o¤ering x, and p() is a strictly increasing, strictly concave function of  such that p(0) = 0.
Similarly, a vacancy o¤ering the lifetime income x nds a worker at the Poisson rate q((x)),
where q() = p()= is a strictly decreasing function of  such that q(0) =1 and q(1) = 0. We
shall refer to (x) as the tightness of submarket x.
When a worker and a rm meet in submarket x, the rm o¤ers the worker an employment
contract worth x in lifetime income. If the worker rejects the o¤er, the rm retains its vacancy and
the worker returns to his prior employment state (either unemployment or employment at some
other rm). If the worker accepts the o¤er, the rm and the worker start production. The rm
and the worker are not immediately aware of the quality z of their match. Instead, they discover
the quality of their match at the rate  > 0. The quality of the match is drawn from a twice
di¤erentiable cumulative distribution function F (z) with a mean normalized to 1. The quality of
the match changes at the rate   0, in which case the rm and the worker have to discover it
again. The match becomes unviable for exogenous reasons at the rate   0, in which case the
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rm and the worker break up.
We assume that the contracts o¤ered by rms to workers are bilaterally e¢ cient, in the sense
that they maximize the joint value of the rm-worker match. As discussed in Menzio and Shi
(2011), this assumption is consistent with several contractual environments. Consider two cases.
In the rst case, a contract can specify the workers wage, the workers search strategy on the
job (i.e. in which submarket to search) and the workers quitting strategy (i.e. when to move
into unemployment) contingent on the history of the match and the economy. In this case, the
contract space is rich enough to independently control the allocative decisions of the match and
the distribution of the value of the match between the rm and the worker. Given this contractual
environment, the rm nds it optimal to o¤er a contract such that the allocative decisions maximize
the joint value of the match, and such that the wages provide the worker with the lifetime income
x. In the second case, a contract can specify a sign-on transfer and then a wage contingent on the
history of the match and the economy. The worker is then free to follow his preferred search and
quitting strategy. In this case, the rm nds it optimal to o¤er a contract such that the worker
is the residual claimant of output (and, hence, makes allocative decisions to maximize the joint
value of the match) and a (negative) transfer such that the workers lifetime income is x.
The state ! of aggregate fundamentals belongs to some discrete set 
 = f!1; !2; :::!Ng and
evolves stochastically according to some exogenous process. Specically, the state of the aggregate
fundamentals changes at the rate   0 and, conditional on changing, it takes on the values !^ 2 

with probability (!^j!). The state ! a¤ects two aggregate fundamentals: the discount factor r
and the common component of productivity y. One can think of shocks to y as either shocks to
the quantity of output produced by a worker (as in Kydland and Prescott 1983 or Mortensen and
Pissarides 1994), or as shocks to the price of the output produced by a worker relative to the price
of maintaining a vacancy (as in Kaplan and Menzio 2016). One can think of shocks to r as either
shocks to preferences (as in Eggertsson and Woodford 2003), shocks to the expected growth rate
of the marginal utility of consumption (as in Hall 2017), or shocks to the e¤ective discount rate
caused by the tightening and loosening of an exogenous debt constraint4 (as in Kehoe, Midrigan
and Pastorino 2019).
2.2 Equilibrium
At date t, the state of the economy is described by the tuple  = f!; u; n;Gg, where ! is the
state of the aggregate fundamentals, u is the measure of workers who are unemployed, n is the
measure of workers employed in a match of unknown quality, and G(z) is the measure of employed
4It would be straightforward, albeit tedious, to embed our model within a large family structure as in Kehoe,
Midrigan and Pastorino (2019). The same equations would describe the behavior of family members across em-
ployment states. An additional equation describing the evolution of the multiplier on the debt constraint would
determine the discount rate r.
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workers in a match of quality non-greater than z. Thus, we have u+ n+G(1) = 1. In principle,
the equilibrium value and policy functions might depend both on the exogenous fundamentals,
!, and on the endogenous distribution of workers across employment states, fu; n;Gg. However,
as established in Menzio and Shi (2011), the equilibrium is block recursive, in the sense that the
value and policy functions only depend on ! and not on fu; n;Gg. In light of this observation, we
denote as U(!) the value of unemployment to a worker, as V0(!) the joint value of a rm-worker
match of unknown quality, as V (z; !) the joint value of a rm-worker match of quality z. Finally,
we let (x; !) denote the tightness of submarket x.
The value U(!) of unemployment to a worker is such that
r(!)U(!) = b+ max
x
[p((x; !)) (x  U(!))]  U(!) + E[U(!^)  U(!)]. (2.1)
The above expression is easy to understand. The ow income of an unemployed worker is b. At
rate p((x; !)), the worker meets a vacancy in submarket x. In this case, the worker experiences
a change in value of x  U(!). At rate , the worker permanently exits the labor market. In this
case, the worker experiences a change in value of 0   U(!). At rate , the fundamentals of the
economy change. In this case, the worker experiences a change in value of U(!^)   U(!). Notice
that, as search is directed, the worker chooses the submarket x in which to look for a vacancy.
The joint value V (z; !) of a rm-worker match of quality z is such that
r(!)V (z; !) = y(!)z + max
x
[p((x; !)) (x  V (z; !))] +  [V0(!)  V (z; !)]
+ [U(!)  V (z; !)]  V (z; !) + E[maxfV (z; !^); U(!^)g   V (z; !)].
(2.2)
The ow income of a rm-worker pair of quality z is y(!)z. At rate p((x; !)), the worker meets
a vacancy in submarket x. In this case, the rm-worker pair experiences a change in the joint
value of x   V (z; !), as the worker is hired by the vacancy and enjoys a continuation value of x
and the rm loses the worker and enjoys a continuation value of 0. Notice that, as the employment
contract between the rm and the worker is bilaterally e¢ cient, x is chosen to maximize the joint
value of the match. At rate , the quality of the match is reset and has to be rediscovered. In this
case, the rm-worker pair experiences a change in the joint value of V0(!)   V (z; !). At rate ,
the match is broken for exogenous reasons. In this case, the rm-worker pair experiences a change
in the joint value of U(!) V (z; !), as the worker becomes unemployed and enjoys a continuation
value of U(!) and the rm loses the worker and enjoys a continuation value of 0. At rate ,
the worker permanently exits the labor market. In this case, the rm-worker pair experiences a
change in the joint value of 0  V (z; !). At rate , there is a fundamental shock. In this case, the
rm-worker pair experiences a change in the joint value of maxfV (z; !^); U(!^)g   V (z; !), where
the maximum between V (z; !^) and U(!^) is the value of the bilaterally e¢ cient choice between
staying together and breaking up.
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The joint value V0(!) of a rm-worker match of unknown quality is such that
r(!)V0(!) = y(!) + E [maxfV (z; !); U(!)g   V0(!)] + max
x
[p((x; !)) (x  V0(!))]
+ [U(!)  V0(!)]  V0(!) + E[maxfV0(!^); U(!^)g   V0(!)].
(2.3)
The expected ow income of a rm-worker pair of unknown quality is y(!). At rate , the rm-
worker pair discovers the quality z of their match. In this case, the rm-worker pair experiences a
change in value of maxfV (z; !); U(!)g   V0(!), where the max between V (z; !) and U(!) is the
value of the bilaterally e¢ cient choice between staying together and breaking up. The remaining
terms on the right-hand side of (2.3) have a direct counterpart in (2.2) and need no further
explanation.
The tightness (x; !) of submarket x is such that
k  q((x; !)) (V0(!)  x) , (2.4)
and (x; !)  0, where the two inequalities hold with complementary slackness. The left-hand
side of (2.4) is the cost to a rm from maintaining a vacancy in submarket x. The right-hand
side is the benet to a rm from maintaining a vacancy in submarket x, which is given by the
product between the rate at which the rm lls its vacancy, q((x; !)), and the value to the rm
from lling its vacancy, V0(!)   x. Condition (2.4) states that, if some vacancies are maintained
in submarket x and, hence, (x; !) is strictly positive, then the cost of a vacancy must equal the
benet. If no vacancies are maintained in submarket x, the cost of a vacancy must exceed the
benet.
The search problems in (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) have a common structure and their solution
can be characterized at once. Consider the search problem for a worker who is currently in an
employment state with arbitrary value v (where v is U if the worker is unemployed and V if he is
employed). The search problem can be written as
D(v; !) = max
x;
p() (x  v) , s.t.  = (x; !). (2.5)
In words, (2.5) states that the worker chooses the lifetime income x promised by the vacancy and
the tightness  of the submarket in which the vacancy is located so as to maximize p()(x   v),
taking as given the equilibrium market tightness function (x; !). For any  > 0, (2.4) implies
that the value x o¤ered by the vacancy is V0(!)   k=q() and, hence, the objective function in
(2.5) is equal to p()(V0(!)  v)  k. For any  = 0, p() = 0 and, hence, the objective function
in (2.5) is equal to zero and, also, equal to p()(V0(!)  v) = k.
In light of the previous observations, we can rewrite (2.5) as
D(v; !) = max

p() (V0(!)  v)  k. (2.6)
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In words, (2.6) states that the worker chooses the tightness  of the submarket in which to search
so as to maximize the product between the rate at which he meets a new rm, p(), and the joint
value of a meeting with a new rm, V0(!)   v, net of the cost of maintaining  vacancies, k.
The formulation in (2.6) makes it clear that the market tightness function (x; !) is such that,
when the worker is deciding where to search, he internalizes both the rmscost of maintaining
vacancies and the rmsbenet from lling vacancies in di¤erent submarkets.
Using (2.6), we can characterize the solution to the search problems in (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3).
When unemployed, the worker searches in a submarket with tightness u(!) such that
k  p0(u(!)) (V0(!)  U(!)) , (2.7)
and u(!)  0, where the two inequalities hold with complementary slackness. Condition (2.7) is
intuitive. The optimal tightness u(!) is such that the cost to the rm of maintaining an additional
vacancy is equated to the benet to the worker and the rm of increasing the rate at which they
meet.
When employed in a match of quality z, the worker searches in a submarket with tightness
e(z; !) such that
k  p0(e(z; !)) (V0(!)  V (z; !)) , (2.8)
and e(z; !)  0, where the two inequalities hold with complementary slackness. Condition (2.8)
implies that, when a worker is employed in a match of quality z with V (z; !)  V0(!), he will
search in a submarket with zero tightness, as the joint value of the match between the worker
and his current employer is greater than the joint value of a match between the worker and a
new employer. For the same reason, when a worker is currently employed in a match of unknown
quality, he will search in a submarket with zero tightness.
Lastly, we characterize the solution of the problem of a rm-worker pair discovering the quality
of their match. The rm-worker pair remains together if the quality z of their match is such that
V (z; !)  U(!), and it breaks up if z is such that V (z; !) < U(!). Let the reservation quality
R(!) be dened as the quality that makes the pair indi¤erent between remaining together and
breaking up, i.e.
V (R(!); !) = U(!). (2.9)
Since the joint value of the match V (z; !) is strictly increasing in z, it follows that the rm-worker
pair remains together if the quality z of their match exceeds the reservation quality R(!), and it
breaks up if the quality of their match falls short of the reservation quality.
We dene the surplus S(z; !) of a rm-worker match of quality z as the di¤erence between the
joint value of the match, V (z; !), and the value of unemployment, U(!). Subtracting (2.1) from
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(2.2) and using (2.6), we obtain the following expression for S(z; !):
(r(!) +  +  + )S(z; !)
= y(!)z   b+  [p(e(z; !)) (S0(!)  S(z; !))  ke(z; !)]
+  [S0(!)  S(z; !)]  [p(u(!))S0(!)  ku(!)] + E [maxfS(z; !^); 0g].
(2.10)
Similarly, we dene the surplus S0(!) of a rm-worker match of unknown quality as V0(!) U(!).
Subtracting (2.1) from (2.3) and using (2.6), we obtain the following expression for S0(!):
(r(!) +  +  + )S0(!)
= y   b+  R
R(!)
[S(z; !)  S0(!)] dF (z)
  [p(u(!))S0(!)  ku(!)] + E [maxfS0(!^); 0g]
(2.11)
Using (2.10) and S(R(!); !) = 0, we obtain an explicit formula for the reservation quality
R(!):
yR(!) = b+ (1  ) [p(u(!))S0(!)  ku(!)]
 S0(!)  E[maxfS(R(!); !^); 0g].
(2.12)
The left-hand side of (2.12) is the reservation quality multiplied by the aggregate component
of productivity (i.e., the ow income from employment at the reservation quality). The right-
hand side is the sum of four terms. The rst term is the ow income from unemployment. The
second term is the di¤erence between the ow value of searching while unemployed rather than
while employed at the reservation quality. The third term is the negative of the ow value of
an idiosyncratic productivity shock while employed at the reservation quality. The last term is
the negative of the di¤erence between the ow value of an aggregate fundamental shock while
unemployed rather than while employed at the reservation quality.
As the reader can see, the equilibrium conditions (2.10) and (2.11) for the value functions
S0 and S, and the equilibrium conditions (2.7), (2.8) and (2.12) for the policy functions u, e
and R are independent of the distribution of workers across employment states. For this reason,
the equilibrium is block recursive. The distribution of workers across employment states evolves
according to the policy functions. Specically, during any interval of time in which the aggregate
fundamentals remain unchanged, the distribution of workers across employment states evolves
according to the di¤erential equations
u =  + (1  u) + nF (R(!))  u [ + p(u(!))] , (2.13)
n = up(u(!)) +
Z
R(!)
( + p(e(z; !))) dG(z)  n ( + + ) , (2.14)
G(z) = n [F (z)  F (R(!))] 
Z z
R(!)
( +  +  + p(e(z^; !))) dG(z^). (2.15)
The laws of motion above are easy to understand. For instance, the change u in the measure
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of unemployed workers is equal to the ow of workers who enter the labor market, plus the ow
of workers who move from employment into unemployment for either exogenous or endogenous
reasons, net of the ow of workers who exit unemployment either because they exit the labor
market or because they nd a job. Similarly, (2.14) and (2.15) express the change in the measure
of workers who are employed in a match of unknown quality, n, and the change in the measure
of workers in a match of quality non-greater than z, G(z), as the di¤erence between ows in and
ows out.
When the state of the aggregate fundamentals changes from ! to !^, there might be some
discontinuity in the evolution of the distribution of workers across employment states. Letting +
denote measures immediately after the aggregate shock, we have
u(+) = u+ [G(R(!^)) G(R(!))] , (2.16)
n(+) = n, (2.17)
G(z+) = G(z) G(R(!^)) if z > R(!^), 0 else: (2.18)
2.3 High discounts
We now want to analytically characterize the e¤ect of an increase in the discount rate r on the
equilibrium value and policy functions and, in turn, on the labor market. Specically, we consider
the e¤ect of a change in the aggregate state of the economy from ! to some !^, with y(!^) = y(!)
and r(!^) = r(!) + dr, where dr > 0 is arbitrarily small. Since y(!^) = y(!) and r(!^) = r(!) + dr,
we express the e¤ect of moving from state ! to state !^ on the value functions and on the policy
functions in terms of their derivatives with respect to r. To keep the analysis simple, we assume
that shocks to the aggregate fundamentals are unanticipated and permanent, in the sense that the
switching rate  is zero.5
We start by examining the e¤ect of the discount rate on the value functions. Let @S0=@r denote
the derivative of the surplus of a match of unknown quality with respect to r and @S(z)=@r the
derivative of the surplus of a match of quality z with respect to r. The derivative @S0=@r is such
that
(r +  +  + + p(u))
@S0
@r
=  S0 + 
Z
R
@S(z)
@r
dF (z), (2.19)
where the expression above is obtained by di¤erentiating (2.11) with respect to r and by making
5Throughout the analysis, we maintain the assumption that the value and policy functions take non-degenerate
values in the aggregate state !. Specically, we assume that the surplus S0 of a rm-worker match with unknown
quality is strictly positive, so that the tightness u(!) is strictly positive. Similarly, we assume that the reservation
quality R(!) is on the support of F , so that changes in the reservation quality have an e¤ect on outcomes. Relaxing
these assumptions would simply turn the strict inequalities in (2.30)-(2.33) into weak inequalities.
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use of the optimality condition (2.7) for u. The derivative @S(z)=@r is such that
(r +  +  +  + p(e(z)))
@S(z)
@r
=  S(z)  (p(u)  p(e(z))  ) @S0
@r
, (2.20)
where the expression above is obtained by di¤erentiating (2.10) with respect to r and by making
use of the optimality condition (2.8) for e(z). Solving (2.20) with respect to @S(z)=@r and
substituting the solution into the right-hand side of (2.19), we nd that @S0=@r < 0. That is,
an increase in the discount rate lowers the surplus of a rm-worker match of unknown quality.
Intuitively, an increase in the discount rate reduces the di¤erence between the present value of the
income generated by a rm and a worker that are matched together relative to the present value
of the income generated by a rm and a worker that are unmatched.
Next, we examine the e¤ect of the discount rate on the policy functions. Let @u=@r denote
the derivative of the tightness of the submarket where unemployed workers look for vacancies with
respect to r. The derivative @u=@r is such that
0 = p0(u)
@S0
@r
+ p00(u)
@u
@r
. (2.21)
Since p0() > 0, p00() < 0 and @S0=@r < 0, (2.21) implies @u=@r < 0. That is, an increase in the
discount rate lowers the tightness of the submarket where unemployed workers look for vacancies.
This nding is also intuitive. As established above, an increase in the discount rate lowers the
surplus of a rm-worker match of unknown quality, i.e. it lowers the di¤erence between the joint
value of a new rm-worker match and the value of unemployment. Consequently, an increase in
the discount rate induces unemployed workers to search for vacancies in a submarket with lower
tightness. This is the e¤ect of high discounts highlighted by Hall (2017). In Hall (2017), this e¤ect
is illustrated in a model where the search process is random. The same e¤ect is at work here, in
a model where the search process is directed.
The derivative @R=@r of the reservation quality R with respect to the discount rate r is such
that
y
@R
@r
= [(1  )p(u)  ] @S0
@r
, (2.22)
where the expression above makes use of the optimality condition (2.8) for u. Since @S0=@r < 0,
an increase in the discount rate lowers the reservation quality if (1  )p(u)   > 0, and raises
the reservation quality if (1  )p(u)   < 0. Also this nding is easy to understand. The value
of unemployment includes a current payo¤ the ow income b and a future payo¤ the value
of searching. The joint value of a match of quality R includes a current payo¤ the ow income
yR and a future payo¤ the value of searching and the value of an idiosyncratic productivity
shock. The future payo¤ is larger in the value of unemployment than in the joint value of a match
of quality R i¤ (1 )p(u)  > 0. Thus, i¤ (1 )p(u)  > 0, an increase in r lowers the value
of unemployment more than the joint value of a match of quality R, and R must fall to maintain
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the indi¤erence between unemployment and employment at the reservation quality. This e¤ect of
high discounts is novel, since Hall (2017) considers a model in which all rm-worker matches are
identical.
Let us look in some detail at the condition
(1  )p(u)   > 0. (2.23)
Condition (2.23) is e¤ectively a condition under which the decision of breaking the match is an
investment, in the sense that breaking the match involves future benets and upfront costs. The
condition is certainly satised if workers cannot search on the job ( = 0) and the quality of a
rm-worker match is permanent ( = 0). More generally, the condition is laxer when the job-
nding rate p(u) for unemployed workers is higher, when the relative e¢ ciency  of search on the
job is lower, and when the rate  at which the quality of a match changes is lower. Empirically, the
condition is likely to be satised. Indeed, the job-nding rate for unemployed worker is about 26%
per month, the job-nding rate for employed workers is around 2% per month which suggests
that  is low and the rate at which matches break-up is very low at long tenures which suggests
that  is low. Later on, we will make these observations precise. For now, we will proceed under
the assumption that condition (2.23) holds.
Lastly, we examine the e¤ect of an increase in the discount rate on the UE and EU rates. To
this aim, suppose that, at the time of the positive shock to the discount rate, the distribution
of workers across employment states is at its stationary level fu; n; Gg. From (2.13)-(2.15), it
follows that
u =
 + heu
 + heu + hue
, (2.24)
n
1  u =
 +  +  + hee
 +  +  + (1  F (R)) , (2.25)
G(z) =
1
 +  + 

n [F (z)  F (R)]  
Z z
R
p(e(z^))dG
(z^)

, (2.26)
where hue, h

eu and h

ee denote the UE, EU and EE rates at the stationary distribution and are
given by
hue = p(u), (2.27)
heu =  +
n
1  uF (R), (2.28)
hee =

1  u
Z
R
p(e(z))dG
(z). (2.29)
At the time of the positive shock to the discount factor, there is no instantaneous change in
the distribution of workers across employment states. The UE and EU rates, however, do change
because of the instantaneous change in the policy functions. In particular, the change in the UE
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and EU rates relative to hue and h

eu is
@hue
@r
= p0(u)
@u
@r
< 0, (2.30)
@heu
@r
=
n
1  uF
0(R)
@R
@r
< 0. (2.31)
On impact, both the UE and the EU rate fall. Intuitively, an increase in the discount rate lowers
the tightness of the submarket where unemployed workers look for vacancies and, thus, it leads to
a decline in the UE rate. An increase in the discount rate lowers the reservation quality and, thus,
it leads to a decline in the EU rate. In the data, however, recessions start with a sharp increase
in the EU rate coupled with a decline in the UE rate (see, e.g., Menzio and Shi 2011).
Over time, the distribution of workers across employment states evolves according to the laws
of motion (2.13)-(2.15). Once the distribution reaches its new steady-state, the change in the UE
and EU rates relative to hue and h

ee is
@hue
@r
= p0(u)
@u
@r
, (2.32)
@heu
@r
=
n
1  u
 +  +  + 
 +  +  + (1  F (R))F
0(R)
@R
@r
+
F (R)
 +  +  + (1  F (R))
@hee
@r
(2.33)
The derivative in (2.32) implies that the UE rate is lower at the new than at the old steady state.
The derivative in (2.33) implies that the EU rate is lower at the new than at the old steady state,
as long as the EE rate declines. Overall, a positive discount rate shock cannot possibly lead to a
stationary equilibrium where the UE and EE rates are lower and the EU rate is higher. In the
data, though, recessions feature precisely lower UE and EE rates, and a higher EU rate (see, e.g.,
Menzio and Shi 2011).
We summarize the analysis of the baseline model in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (High Discounts) Consider an unanticipated and permanent positive shock to the
discount factor. If (1  )p(u)   > 0, then:
(i) On impact, the shock lowers the UE and EU rates;
(ii) In steady-state, the shock either lowers the UE and EU rates, or it lowers the UE rate and
increases the EU and EE rates.
3 Calibration
In this section, we calibrate the model using some crucial features of workersreallocation in the
US labor market: the average UE, EU and EE rates, as well as the relationship between EU
and EE rates and job tenure. Using the calibrated model, we simulate the response of the labor
market to an increase in the rate at which agents discount future income, and compare it with
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the response of the labor market to a decline in the aggregate component of productivity. We nd
that an increase in the discount rate leads to a small decline in the UE and EU rates and to a
negligible change in the unemployment rate. In contrast, a decline in the aggregate component
of productivity leads to a sizeable decline in the UE rate and a sizeable increase in the EU rate,
leading to an even larger change in the unemployment rate. Since the UE rate and the EU rate
move in opposite directions over the business cycles, our ndings represent a challenge for the high
discount hypothesis of labor market uctuations.
3.1 Parameters and data
The model is described by a handful of fundamentals. The search process is described by the
vacancy cost k, the ow income of unemployment b, the job-nding rate function p(), and the
intensity of search on the job . The production process is described by the aggregate component
of productivity y, which we normalize to 1, the distribution F of the idiosyncratic component of
productivity, and the rate  at which a match is exogenously destroyed. The learning process is
described by the rate  at which a rm-worker pair discovers the quality of their match and by
the rate  at which the quality of the match is redrawn. The entry-and-exit process is described
by the exit rate . We assume that p() is of the form , where  2 [0; 1] is the elasticity of the
job-nding rate to the vacancy-to-applicant ratio. We assume that F is a Weibull distribution
with shape , scale  and a location parameter chosen so that the average of the distribution is 1.
The Weibull distribution encompasses distributions with declining density, hump-shaped density
and a thick right tail, and hump-shaped densities and a thick left tail.
We calibrate the parameters of the model using moments constructed from the US Census
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for male workers with a high school degree
and no further degree. We focus on male workers to minimize the discrepancy between the model
where workers enter the labor force and then exit it permanently and the data where workers
transition in and out of the labor force. We focus on high-school graduates because they represent
the largest as well as the median education group. We refer the reader to Menzio, Telyukova and
Visschers (2016) for additional details on the data.6
We construct the following moments: (i) the monthly UE rate; (ii) the fraction of workers
with t months of tenure in their job who, in the next month, leave for unemployment (EU rate by
tenure) or for another job (EE rate by tenure); (iii) the fraction of workers who, before reaching
6It is well-known that the UE, EU and EE rates in the SIPP and the Current Population Survey (CPS) microdata
are not identical. In the SIPP, workers are interviewed every four months and can report a maximum of two distinct
employers for each four-month period. For this reason, the SIPP features slightly lower UE, EU and EE rates than
the CPS (see, e.g., Nagypal 2008). Moreover, we adopt a di¤erent denition of unemployment than the BLS.
Specically, we consider workers who are with a job, on layo¤as employed rather than as unemployed (as the
they would in the CPS). Since workers with a job, on layo¤are in a relationship with their employer and they
expect to return to their job, we believe that through the lens of the model they should be counted as employed.
For this reason too, our UE and EU rates are lower than in the CPS microdata.
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a tenure of t months in their job, leave for unemployment (cumulative EU ow by tenure) or for
another job (cumulative EE ow by tenure); (iv) the fraction of workers who reach a tenure of t
months (survival by tenure); (v) the monthly EU and EE rates implied by the previous moments.7
We calibrate k so that the average UE rate in the model is the same as in the data (26% per
month). We calibrate  so that the average EE rate in the model is the same as in the data (1:7%
per month). We calibrate  so that the average EU rate in the model is the same as in the data
(0:95% per month). We calibrate , which controls how quickly a rm-worker pair discovers the
quality of its match, so that the fraction of jobs that end within a year is the same in the model as
in the data (45%). We calibrate , which controls the frequency of shocks to the quality of a match,
so that the hazard rate for jobs with tenure above 4.5 years is the same in the model and in the
data. We calibrate , which determines the shape of the Weibull distribution, so as to minimize
the distance between the shape of the tenure proles in the model and in the data.8 We set  to
0:1% per month, some low, positive value to guarantee that the stationary distribution of workers
across employment states is non-degenerate for any choice of the match quality distribution.9
Lastly, we need to choose values for the parameters ,  and b. We set , the rate at which
workers exit the labor market, to 0:27% per month. This value implies that a worker remains in the
labor market for an average of 35 years. We set , the elasticity of the job-nding rate with respect
to the vacancy-to-applicant ratio, to 1=2. This is the value typically chosen in the literature. We
set b, the ow income of unemployment, so as to equal 70% of the average productivity of labor.
This percentage has now become the standard target for b in the literature, in light of Hall and
Milgrom (2008). Our ndings are qualitatively robust to changes in the value of these parameters.
The calibrated match quality distribution is a Weibull with shape parameter  = 1:5 and scale
parameter  = 0:34. This is a distribution with a standard deviation of 21%, a skewness of 1:1,
and a kurtosis of 4:4. The calibrated  is 1:89, which implies that, on average, a rm-worker pair
7Let us explain how we construct the EU and EE rates. We compute the stationary distribution of employed
workers by tenure, using the monthly UE rate and the fraction of workers who leave their job after t months of
tenure. Using the stationary distribution of employed workers by tenure, we use the EU and EE rates by tenure to
calculate the average EU and EE rates. Alternatively, we could have directly computed the fraction of employed
workers who, in the next month, move into unemployment and into another job. The two approaches to computing
EU and EE rates give similar results for both the EU rate (0:95% versus 0:65%) and for the EE rate (1:8% versus
1:7%). The di¤erence may be due to lifecycle changes in transition rates that cannot be captured by our perpetual
youth model, or by other forms of worker heterogeneity that are not included in our model (see, e.g., Gregory,
Menzio and Wiczer 2020). We chose the indirect approach to computing the EU and EE rates because it is
consistent with the model. It is worth noting that, if we use the direct measures of the EU and EE rates, our
qualitative ndings on the e¤ect of an increase in the discount rate do not change.
8The logic behind the calibration strategy is straightforward and well-established (see, e.g., Menzio and Shi
2011, Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers 2016, or Gregory, Menzio and Wiczer 2020). Taking as given the other
parameters: an increase in k lowers the UE rate; an increase in  raises the EE rate; an increase in  raises F (R)
and, thus, the EU rate; an increase in  raises the rate at which the match quality is discovered and, thus, the
fraction of jobs that terminate in less than one year; an increase in  raises the rate at which the quality of a match
is reset and, hence, the EU and EE rates at long tenures. The shape of the F distribution determines the density
of qualities above R and, hence, the rate at which the fraction of surviving jobs declines with tenure.
9At the cost of some more computational time, we could have chosen  so as to match the EU rate at long
tenures. As one can infer from Figure 1, this would have resulted in a slightly lower value for .
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(a) EU hazard rate (b) EE hazard rate
(c) Cumulative EU and EE ows (d) Survivors
Notes: Tenure proles for male workers with high school degree in the SIPP (thin black) and in the model
(thick blue).
Figure 1: Tenure Proles
discovers the quality of their match in 6 months. The calibrated  is 0:32, which implies that,
on average, the quality of a match changes once every 3 years. The calibrated  is 0:67, which
implies that workers search with 33% lower intensity while employed than while unemployed. The
calibrated values of the other parameters are k = 0:028,  = 0:012, b = 0:78 and r = 0:04.
Figure 1 plots the tenure proles of the EU and EE rates and the cumulative EU and EE ows
by tenure. Even though the model is very parsimonious, it ts the empirical tenure proles quite
well. The assumption that the quality of a match is initially unknown means that selection takes
place after, rather than before, the start of the employment relationship. For this reason, the
rate at which matches dissolve falls with tenure, as matches of quality z < R dissolve as soon as
their quality is discovered, matches of quality z 2 [R;Q], with Q such that V (Q) = V0, dissolve
as soon as the worker nds a new match, and matches with quality z > Q are maintained. The
assumption that the quality of a match is discovered at a Poisson rate controls the speed at which
the exit rate declines with tenure. The assumption that the quality of a match is redrawn controls
the exit rate even at long tenures.
As expected, condition (2.23) is satised at the calibrated parameter values. The job-nding
rate for unemployed workers is p(u) = 0:26  12 = 3:12 per year. The di¤erence between the
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(a) u, UE, EU, EE rates (b) u, v and tightness
Notes: Percentage change relative to steady state for u (black, solid), UE rate (green, long dash), EU
rate (red, medium dash), EE rate (blue, short dash) v (red, long dash),  (blue, short dash). Transition
rates computed by comparing employment state at one-month intervals and then aggregated at quarterly
level.
Figure 2: High Discounts
e¢ ciency of search o¤ and on the job is 1    = 0:33. The rate at which the quality of a match
is reset is  = 0:32 per year. Overall, (1   )p(u)    = 0:69 > 0. Since condition (2.23) holds,
Proposition 1 applies to the calibrated model.
3.2 Discount shock
Using the calibrated model, we compute the response of the labor market to a positive discount
rate shock. Specically, we assume that the economy is at the steady state associated with a
discount rate r of 4% per year (the steady state at which the model is calibrated). We then hit the
economy with an unanticipated and permanent increase in the discount rate from 4 to 10% per
year.10 The exact magnitude of the discount rate shock is arbitrary, but it does not qualitatively
a¤ect our ndings.
The left panel in Figure 2 shows the response of the UE, EU and EE rates to the r-shock. The
UE rate falls by 3:5%. The EU rate falls by approximately 3% on impact. Over time, the EU rate
keeps falling and reaches a level that is about 6% lower than before the shock. The EE rate falls
by 9% on impact. Over time, the EE rate recovers and settles at a level that is about 6% lower
than before the shock. The UE rate falls because the increase in r lowers the tightness u of the
submarket where unemployed workers look for vacancies. On impact, the EU rate falls because
10Hall (2017) does not directly consider shocks to the discount rate, but shocks to the marginal utility of income.
The shocks to the marginal utility of income are similar to discount rate shocks. For instance, when the economy
is in a state where the marginal utility of income is unusually low and, thus, expected to rise, discounting of future
income is low. Conversely, when the economy is in a state where the marginal utility of income is unusually high
and, thus, expected to fall, discounting of future income is high. We have simulated a version of the model with
the same shocks to marginal utility as in Hall (2017) and found qualitatively similar results. Specically, we found
that the UE and EU rate move together, rather than against each other.
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the increase in r lowers the reservation quality R and, hence, the rm-worker pairs that discover
the quality of their match are less likely to break up. Over time, the EU rate continues to fall
because due to an overall decline in the hiring rate the fraction of rm-worker pairs that are in
a match of unknown quality goes down, and so does the fraction of rm-worker pairs that discover
the quality of their match in a given month. On impact, the EE rate falls because the increase in
r lowers the average tightness of the submarkets where employed workers look for vacancies. Over
time, the EE rate recovers because due to the decline in the reservation quality the distribution
of employed workers shifts towards low-quality matches, which have a higher EE rate.
The right panel in Figure 2 shows the response of unemployment, vacancies and aggregate
market tightness to the r-shock. The unemployment rate is subject to two opposing forces. On
the one hand, unemployment is pushed up by the decline in the UE rate. On the other hand,
unemployment is pushed down by the decline in the EU rate. On impact, the two forces nearly
cancel each other and unemployment barely changes. Over time, the second force becomes stronger
and stronger and unemployment starts falling. Eventually, unemployment settles down to a level
that is 1% lower than before the shock. The vacancy rate falls by about 9%. The aggregate
tightness of the labor market, dened as the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, falls by 8%.
Even though the r-shock does not a¤ect technology directly, it does lead to a decline in labor
productivity. In fact, the increase in r shifts the distribution of employed workers towards matches
of lower quality. First, the increase in r lowers the reservation quality and, for this reason, the
rate at which workers leave low-quality matches for unemployment. Second, the increase in r
lowers the EE rate and, for this reason, the rate at which workers leave low-quality matches for
other matches. Overall, labor productivity declines by 0:25%. Borrowing the language of Barlevy
(2002), we say that an increase in r has a sullyinge¤ect.
The response of the labor market to an r-shock does not resemble the behavior of the US labor
market in a typical recession. In a typical recession, the UE rate falls by about 30%, the EU
rate increases by about 20% and, as a result of both the movement in the UE and EU rates, the
unemployment rate increases by around 50%. An r-shock, in contrast, leads to a decline in both
the UE and the EU rate. The decline in the EU rate dominates the decline in the UE rate and
the unemployment rate actually falls, albeit by as little as 1%.
3.3 Productivity shock
We now want to compare and contrast the response of the labor market to a positive discount rate
shock and the response of the labor market to a negative productivity shock. We assume that the
economy is at the steady state associated with a discount rate r of 4% per year and an aggregate
component of productivity y of 1 (the steady state at which the model is calibrated). We then hit
the economy with an unanticipated and permanent negative shock to the aggregate component of
19
(a) u, UE, EU, EE rates (b) u, v and tightness
Notes: Percentage change relative to steady state for u (black, solid), UE rate (green, long dash), EU
rate (red, medium dash), EE rate (blue, short dash) v (red, long dash),  (blue, short dash). Transition
rates computed by comparing employment state at one-month intervals and then aggregated at quarterly
level.
Figure 3: Low Productivity
productivity of 5%. The exact magnitude of the shock is arbitrary, but it does not qualitatively
a¤ect our ndings.
The left panel in Figure 3 shows the response of the UE, EU and EE rates to the y-shock. The
UE rate falls by 10%. The EU rate increases by more than 50% on impact and then falls to a level
that is 30% higher than before the shock. The EE rate falls by approximately 15%. As discussed
in Menzio and Shi (2011), the UE rate falls because the y-shock lowers the di¤erence between the
value of a rm-worker match and the value of unemployment and, hence, it induces unemployed
workers to search for vacancies in a submarket with a lower tightness. The EU rate increases
because the y-shock raises the reservation quality, as it lowers the di¤erence between the value
of a rm-worker match and the value of unemployment. The EE rate falls because the y-shock
lowers the average tightness of the submarkets where employed workers look for vacancies.
The right panel in Figure 3 shows the response of unemployment, vacancies and aggregate
market tightness to the y-shock. Unemployment increases by almost 40%. The increase in un-
employment is caused by both the decline in the UE rate and by the increase in the EU rate.
Vacancies fall by approximately 10%, as the result of two opposing forces. On the one hand,
both unemployed workers and employed workers look for vacancies in submarkets with a lower
tightness. This tends to lower vacancies. On the other hand, the fraction of unemployed workers
increases and the fraction of employed workers decreases. Since unemployed workers search in
tighter submarkets than employed worker, this tends to increase vacancies. Overall, the rst e¤ect
dominates and vacancies decline.
We also nd that labor productivity falls by 4:5%, which is less than the decline in the aggregate
component of productivity y. The decline in labor productivity is dampened because, in response
to the shock, rms and workers increase their reservation quality causing an increase in the average
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idiosyncratic component of productivity z. Borrowing the language of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994), we say that a y-shock has a cleansinge¤ect.
Overall, the response of the labor market to the y-shock reproduces quite closely the behavior
of the labor market in a typical US recession: the UE and EE rate fall, while the EU rate increases;
the unemployment rate rises, while the vacancy rate falls. As in the data, the uctuations in labor
market outcomes are much larger than the decline in labor productivity. The percentage decline
of the UE rate is 2:5 times larger than the percentage decline in labor productivity, the percentage
increase of the EU rate 6 times larger, the percentage decline in the EE rate 3 times larger, and the
percentage increase in unemployment 6 times larger. These ndings conrm the results in Menzio
and Shi (2011), even though the model considered here is richer and the calibration strategy uses
more data.
The main shortcoming of the hypothesis that labor market uctuations are driven by y-shocks
is not lack of amplication a point made by Shimer (2005) in the context of a much simpler
search-theoretic model, and then prominently repeated by Hall (2017) and Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2017). The main shortcoming of the hypothesis of y-shocks driving cyclical uctuations in the
labor market is that, since 1984, the contemporaneous correlation between labor productivity and
unemployment is e¤ectively zero, a fact that is largely due to labor productivity recovering much
more quickly than unemployment after a recession. In this sense, the main shortcoming of the
hypothesis of y-shocks driving labor market uctuations is lack of propagation.11
4 Robustness
In this section, we show that our main nding i.e., the UE and EU rates counterfactually move
in the same direction in response to r-shocks is robust to alternative specications of the model.
First, we consider a version of the model in which search is random, rather than directed. We
nd that an increase in r lowers both the UE and EU rates. Second, we consider a version of
the model in which the quality of a new rm-worker match is known and evolves stochastically
over time, rather than being unknown and revealed over time. We consider a jump process for
quality a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), as well as a continuous Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
In both cases, an increase in r lowers both the UE and the EU rate. Third, we consider a lifecycle
version of the model in which workers accumulate human capital on the job. At the aggregate
level, an r-shock generates the correct negative comovement between UE and EU rates. However,
the shock still generates a positive comovement between the UE and EU rates for older workers,
which is counterfactual. More importantly, an r-shock generates responses in the UE and EU
11Kaplan and Menzio (2016), Gali and van Rens (2018) and Golosov and Menzio (2020) propose alternative
theories of labor market uctuations, which generate low contemporaneous correlation between labor productivity
and unemployment and that, unlike the high discount theory, do not imply counterfactual movements in the EU
rate.
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rates that are much larger for younger than for older workers, while in the data the UE and EU
rates display very similar uctuations across di¤erent age groups.
4.1 Random search
In the baseline model, search is directed by the employment contracts o¤ered by rms to work-
ers. Now we want to consider a version of the model with random search. We assume that an
unemployed worker meets a vacancy at the rate p(), an employed worker meets vacancy at the
rate p(), where  denotes the ratio between the measure of vacancies v and the measure of
searching workers u + (1   u). Similarly, a vacancy meets an unemployed worker at the rate
q()u=(u+(1 u)) and an employed worker at the rate q()(1 u)=(u+(1 u)). Upon meet-
ing, a rm and a worker bargain over the terms of a bilaterally e¢ cient contract. The outcome of
the bargain maximizes the Nash product, where the gains from trade accruing to the worker are
taken to the power of , with  2 [0; 1], and the gains from trade accruing to the rm are taken
to the power of 1   . The gains from trade accruing to either party are dened as di¤erence
between the value of the match to that party and their outside option. The outside option of
the rm is the value of a vacancy. If the worker is unemployed, his outside option is the value of
unemployment. If the worker is employed, his outside option is the joint value of the match with
his current employer. These are the same specications of the bargaining solution as in Cahuc,
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) and many subsequent papers.
Under random search, the equilibrium is not block recursive in the sense that the value and
policy functions depend not only on the state of the aggregate fundamentals, !, but also on
the distribution of workers across employment states, fu; n;Gg. For this reason, the equilibrium
cannot be solved outside of a non-stochastic steady state. At a steady state, the reservation quality
R is such that
yR = b+ (1  )p()S0   S0. (4.1)
The left-hand side of (4.1) is the reservation quality multiplied by the aggregate component of
productivity (i.e., the ow income from employment at the reservation quality). The right-hand
side is the sum of three terms. The rst term is the ow income from unemployment. The
second term is the di¤erence between the ow value of searching while unemployed rather than
while employed at the reservation quality. The third term is the negative of the ow value of
an idiosyncratic productivity shock while employed at the reservation quality. Condition (4.1)
suggests that, as long as an increase in the discount rate r lowers the tightness of the labor
market, , and the surplus of a rm-worker match of unknown quality, S0, it will also lower the
steady-state reservation quality R as long as (1  )p() > :
We calibrate the random-search version of the model exactly as in Section 3. We do not attempt
to calibrate the workers bargaining power, . The natural target to calibrate  is the average
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change in a workers wage upon transitioning from one job to another job. However, in order to
compute the analogue of this target in the model, we would have to make some assumptions about
the timing of wage payments from the rm to the worker, assumptions that are of no consequence
to the equilibrium allocation. Instead, we carry out the calibration for three di¤erent values of the
workers bargaining power: 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75.12 For each calibration, we nd that a permanent,
unanticipated increase in the discount rate from 4 to 10% generates a decline in the steady-state
UE, EU and EE rates.
4.2 Stochastic productivity
In the baseline model, the quality of a new match is unknown and it is discovered at some rate .
Now we want to consider a version of the model in which the quality of a new match is known,
but changes over time according to some stochastic process.
We rst consider a stochastic process similar to the one in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
In Mortensen and Pissarides, the idiosyncratic productivity of a new match is z0 = zh. At some
rate   0, the idiosyncratic productivity of the match changes and it is randomly drawn from
a cumulative distribution function F , where F is uniform with support [z`; zh]. This stochastic
process is meant to capture the idea that a rm designs a new job optimally, so that its productivity
is initially at the technological frontier. Over time, though, the economic environment facing the
rm might change, so that the productivity of the job might fall below the technological frontier.
In order to preserve the spirit of the stochastic process proposed by Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) while relaxing the assumption that the distribution F is uniform, we assume that z0 is
the 90th percentile of F , where F is some Weibull distribution with shape parameter  and scale
parameter .
In the Mortensen-Pissarides version of the model, the reservation productivity R is such that
yR = b+ (1  ) [p(u)S(z0)  ku]  
Z
R
S(z)dF (z). (4.2)
The left-hand side of (4.2) is the reservation quality multiplied by the aggregate component of
productivity. The right-hand side is the sum of three terms. The rst term is the ow income
from unemployment. The second term is the di¤erence between the ow value of searching while
unemployed rather than while employed at the reservation quality. The third term is the negative
of the ow value of an idiosyncratic productivity shock while employed at the reservation quality.
12Let us place these values for the workers bargaining power  in context. Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2006) use French data and estimate  by workers occupation and sector, and nd s ranging from 0 (low-skill
occupations in manufacturing) to 0:98 (high-skill occupations in construction). Bagger et al. (2014) use Danish
data and estimate  to be between 0:29 and 0:31, depending on the workers educational attainment. Herkenho¤
et al. (2019) use US data and estimate  to be 0.65. Gregory (2020) uses German data and estimates  to be 0.66.
All of these studies assume that the rm keeps the wage of the worker constant until the worker receives an outside
o¤er that can only be matched by raising the wage.
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(a) EU hazard (b) EE hazard
Notes: EU and EE hazard rates by tenure in the data (black), in the Mortensen-Pissarides version of the
model (blue, solid), and in the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck version of the model (red, dashed).
Figure 4: Tenure Proles with Stochastic Productivity
(a) Mortensen-Pissarides (b) Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
Notes: Percentage change relative to steady state for u (black, solid), UE rate (green, long dash), EU
rate (red, medium dash), EE rate (blue, short dash).
Figure 5: High Discounts with Stochastic Productivity
Condition (4.2) suggests that, as long as  and  are not too large, an increase in the discount
rate r should lower the reservation quality R and, hence, the EU rate.
We calibrate the Mortensen-Pissarides version of the model using a strategy similar to the one
deployed in Section 3. Specically, we choose the vacancy cost, k, to match the average UE rate.
We choose the intensity of search on the job, , to match the average EE rate. We choose the
scale, , of the F distribution to match the average EU rate. We choose the arrival rate, , of an
idiosyncratic productivity shock to match the fraction of jobs with short duration. We choose the
shape, , of the F distribution so as to minimize the distance between the various tenure proles
in the model and in the data.
Figure 4 overlays the tenure proles in the data and in the model. The Mortensen-Pissarides
version of the model does not t the data nearly as well as the baseline model. In particular,
this version of the model predicts an EU hazard rate that is independent of tenure and equal to
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F (R). In contrast, the data (as well as the baseline model) features an EU hazard rate that
sharply declines with tenure. Figure 5 shows the response of the Mortensen-Pissarides version of
the model to a permanent and unanticipated increase in the discount rate from 4 to 10%. As in
the baseline model, the UE, EU and EE rates fall in response to the r-shock. In the data, however,
the UE and EU rates move against each other at the business cycle frequency.
We next consider a continuous stochastic process for the idiosyncratic productivity of a match.
We assume that the productivity of a new match is some z0. Over time, the productivity of the
match evolves according to the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
dz = (z   z)dt+ dWt, (4.3)
where Wt is a standard Wiener process,  is the standard deviation of the Wiener process,  is
a parameter that controls the speed at which z moves towards a mean-reversion point z. The
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is, essentially, a continuous-time version of an AR(1) process.
In the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck version of the model, the reservation productivity R is such that
yR = b+ (1  ) [p(u)S(z0)  ku]  1
2
S 00(R)2. (4.4)
The left-hand side of (4.4) is the reservation quality multiplied by the aggregate component of
productivity. The right-hand side is the sum of three terms. The rst term is the ow income
from unemployment. The second term is the di¤erence between the ow value of searching while
unemployed rather than while employed at the reservation quality. The last term is the negative
of the ow value of an idiosyncratic productivity shock while employed at the reservation quality.
The last term depends on the convexity of the surplus and on the standard deviation of the Weiner
process. Condition (4.4) suggests that, as long as  and  are not too large, an increase in the
discount rate r should lower the reservation quality R and, in turn, the EU rate.
We calibrate the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck version of the model as follows. We choose the vacancy
cost, k, to match the UE rate. We choose the standard deviation, , of the Weiner process to
match the fraction of short duration jobs. We choose the mean-reversion point, z, the speed
of convergence to the mean-reversion point, , and the intensity of search on the job, , so as
to minimize the distance between the model-generated and the empirical EU rate, EE rate and
tenure proles.
The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck version of the model does not t the data as well as the baseline model.
In particular, this version of the model predicts an EU rate that is hump-shaped with respect to
tenure. In the data, however, the EU rate declines monotonically with tenure. Figure 5 shows
the response of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck version of the model to a permanent and unanticipated
increase in the discount rate from 4 to 10%. As in the baseline model, the UE, EU and EE rates
fall in response to the r-shock. In the data, however, the UE and EU rates move in opposite
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directions.
4.3 Human capital accumulation
We now consider a lifecycle version of the model in which workers accumulate human capital
while on the job. This version of the model is natural, as well as relevant to our stated goal of
revisiting the hypothesis that labor market uctuations are driven by uctuations in the discount
rate. The version of the model is natural because it is well-documented that average wages grow
over the lifecycle and that human capital accumulation is the main source of such growth (see, e.g.,
Heckman, Lochner and Taber 2003, Bagger et al. 2014, Gregory 2020). The extension is relevant
for our goal because, in a recent and prominent follow-up to Hall (2017), Kehoe, Midrigan and
Pastorino (2019) show that the response of the labor market to a discount rate shock is amplied
when an employment relationship does not only produce a ow of output, but also allows the
worker to grow his stock of human capital.
We use the model developed and calibrated by Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers (2016, hence-
forth MTV), which is a lifecycle version of our baseline model in which workers accumulate human
capital on the job. Workers enter the labor market when young and exit the labor market when
old according to probabilistic functions (t) and (t) of the workers age t. The labor market
is organized in submarkets indexed by the value x o¤ered by the vacancy to the worker and by
the required human capital, h, and age, t, of the worker. Workers choose in which submarket to
search and rms choose in which submarket to open vacancies, taking as given the equilibrium
tightness function (x; h; t). When matched, a rm and a worker produce a ow of hyz units of
output. The quality z of the match is initially unknown, it is discovered at the rate , and it is
re-drawn at the rate . The wage of the worker is set as a constant fraction of the output ow,
where the fraction obviously depends on the o¤ered value x. The human capital of the worker
depends on his months of work-experience e according to the function h = g(e). We refer the
reader to MTV for an exhaustive description of the environment, the equilibrium conditions, and
the welfare properties of the equilibrium.
The model is calibrated using SIPP data on male workers with a high-school degree, and no
further degree. As we did in Section 3, we calibrate the model to match the average UE, EU and
EE rates and the EU and EE tenure proles. The probability of entry into and exit from the
labor market is calibrated to match the fraction of workers of age t entering and exiting the labor
market. The human capital accumulation function, which they take to have the functional form
g(e) = (1 1)+1(1+e)2 , is calibrated to match the lifecycle prole of average wages.13 Table 1
13The functional form for g is exible. The parameter 1 controls the slope of the function, and the parameter
2 controls the curvature of the function. The functional form for g is designed so that the human capital for a
worker with no experience is always equal to 1 (a normalization). The functional form for g is such that the human
capital is monotonically increasing in experience.
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(a) u, UE, EU, EE rates (b) u, v and tightness
Notes: Percentage change relative to steady state for u (black, solid), UE rate (green, long dash), EU
rate (red, medium dash), EE rate (blue, short dash) v (red, long dash),  (blue, short dash).
Figure 6: High Discounts
in MTV contains the calibrated value of the parameters. Here, it su¢ ces to say that the calibrated
human capital accumulation function (1 = 4:3 and 2 = 0:065) displays steep decreasing returns
to experience, in the sense that a workers productivity nearly doubles with the rst 2:5 years of
experience and only increases by an additional 45% with the next 5 years of experience.14 Tables
2, 3 and 4 in MTV report the t between the targeted moments and the data. Figures 12, 14 and
16 in MTV show that the calibrated model explains well the prole of the UE, EU and EE rates
across di¤erent age groups.
Using the calibrated model, we simulate the response of the labor market to a positive discount
rate shock. As we did in Section 3, we assume that the economy is at the steady state associated
with a discount rate of 4% per year. We then hit the economy with an unanticipated, permanent
increase in the discount rate from 4 to 10%. The left panel in Figure 6 shows the response of the
aggregate UE, EU and EE rates to the r-shock. The right panel in Figure 6 shows the response
of the aggregate unemployment and vacancy rates. A comparison between Figure 6 and Figure
2 clearly reveals that the response of the labor market to an r-shock changes dramatically, once
we take into account the fact that workers accumulate human capital on the job. In response to
the same r-shock, the aggregate UE rate falls by 18% rather than 3:5%, the aggregate EU rate
increases by 15% rather than falling by 6%, the aggregate EE rate falls by 25% rather than 6%.
Similarly, the aggregate unemployment rate increases by almost 30% rather than falling by 1%, and
the aggregate vacancy rate falls by about 20% rather than 9%. Once we take into account human
capital accumulation, not only does the aggregate UE rate become more sensitive to discount rate
14It is useful to compare our calibrated human capital function g with the one in Bagger et al. (2014). Both
human capital functions are concave. The human capital function in Bagger et al. (2014) is increasing for the
rst 20 years of experience and, then, becomes decreasing. As we are skeptical of negative returns to experience,
our human capital function is designed to be non-decreasing and, when calibrated, it only becomes atter with
experience. Our nding that r-shock generate a counterfactually positive comovement in the UE and EU rates of
older workers would only be strengthened if the return to experience was negative for older workers.
27
(a) Ages 21-30 (b) Ages 31-40
(c) Ages 41-50 (d) Ages 51-60
Notes: Percentage change relative to steady state for u (black, solid), UE rate (green, long dash), EU
rate (red, medium dash), EE rate (blue, short dash) for di¤erent age groups.
Figure 7: High Discounts by Workers Age
shocks (a point already made by Kehoe, Midrigan and Pastorino 2019), but the aggregate EU rate
moves in the right direction (a point that is novel to the literature).
We now turn to examine the response to the UE, EU and EE rates at a more disaggregated
level. Figure 7 reports the response of transition and unemployment rates for workers in the age
groups 21-30, 31-40, 41-50 and 51-60. For the youngest group of workers, the UE rate falls by
20% and the EU rate nearly doubles on impact and then settles at a level that is 40% higher
than before the shock. The unemployment rate for these workers rises by 60%. For workers in
the age group 31-40, the UE rate falls by 10% and the EU rate increases by 30% on impact and
then settles at a level that is 5% higher than before the shock. The unemployment rate for these
workers increases by about 18%. For the workers in the age group 41-50, the UE rate falls by 6%
and the EU rate increases by 10% on impact and then quickly falls back to about the same level
as before the shock. The unemployment rate for these workers increases by about 5%. For the
oldest group of workers, the UE rate falls by 5% and the EU rate falls by 2%. The unemployment
rate for these workers increases by about 2%.
The disaggregated analysis highlights two additional implications of r-shocks. First, the r-
shock generates much larger responses in the UE rate of younger than older workers. For workers
aged 21-30, the UE rate falls by 20%. For workers aged 51-60, the UE rate falls by only 5%.
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Second, the r-shock generates a large positive response in the EU rate of younger workers, and
a small negative response in the EU rate of older workers. For workers aged 21-30, the EU rate
increases by 40%. For workers aged 51-60, the EU rate falls by 2%. As a result of the heterogeneity
in the response of the UE and EU rates, the r-shock generates an increase in unemployment that
declines dramatically with age: 60% for workers aged 21-30, and only 2% for workers aged 51-60.
The ndings in Figures 4 and 5 are easy to understand. First, consider the UE rate. The
higher is the rate at which workers accumulate human capital on the job, the more backloaded
is the income generated by a worker when he is employed relative to the income generated by
the same worker when he is unemployed. For this reason, the higher is the rate of human capital
accumulation, the more sensitive to an increase in the discount rate become the workers value of
moving from unemployment to employment and, in turn, the UE rate. Next, consider the EU rate.
When workers do not accumulate human capital on the job, the income generated by a worker
who is employed at the reservation quality R is frontloaded relative to the income generated by
the same worker in unemployment. In this case, dissolving an employment relationship of quality
R is an investment and, for this reason, R tends to fall in response to an increase in the discount
rate. When workers accumulate human capital on the job at a su¢ ciently high rate, the income
generated by a worker who is employed at R becomes backloaded relative to the income generated
by an unemployed worker. In this case, keeping an employment relationship of quality R is an
investment and, for this reason, R tends to rise in response to an increase in the discount rate.
At the aggregate level, the rate at which workers accumulate human capital is high enough for
the r-shock to produce a large decrease in the UE rate and a substantial rise in the EU rate. The
rate at which workers accumulate human capital on the job, though, falls sharply over the lifecycle
and is low for older workers.15 For this reason, the r-shock produces a much larger response in
the UE rate of younger than older workers, a large positive response in the EU rate of younger
workers, and a negative response in the EU rate of older workers. To paint a picture, the response
of labor market outcomes to an r-shock is similar to Kehoe, Midrigan and Pastorino (2019) for
younger workers, as these workers face a high return of experience on human capital. The response
of labor market outcomes to an r-shock for older worker is essentially the same as in our baseline
model, as these workers face a low return of experience.
At rst glance, the ndings in Figure 6 appear to vindicate the hypothesis of labor market
uctuations caused by r-shocks. Indeed, as it is observed in a typical recession, the response of
the labor market to a positive r-shock features a sizeable decline in the aggregate UE rate, an
15There is a consensus that older workers hardly accumulate any human capital on the job. The consensus is
based on the properties of models where workers allocate their time on the job between learning and productive
activities (see, e.g., Ben Porath 1967), as well as from models in which workers mechanically accumulate human
capital on the job estimated to the empirical lifecycle prole of wages, which attens around age 45 (see, e.g.,
Bagger et al. 2014). The consensus is so strong that the lack of human capital accumulation for older workers is
used as a source of identication (see, e.g., Heckman, Lochner and Taber 1998, Huggett, Ventura and Yaron 2011,
Lagakos et al. 2018 or Gregory 2020).
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(a) u, UE, EU, EE rates
(b) u, v and tightness
Notes: The empirical time-series for the UE and EU rates by age are constructed using the CPS microdata:
(1) Compute the sample-weighted average of the fraction of unemployed workers in month t that report
to be employed in month t+ 1 (raw UE rate) and, similarly, the fraction of employed workers in month t
that report to be unemployed in month t+ 1 (raw EU rate). (2) Seasonally adjust the raw transition rates
using a ratio-to-MA lter as in Shimer (2012). (3) Correct the resulting EU rate for time-aggregation
bias.
Figure 8: UE and EU Rates by Workers Age
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(a) u, UE, EU, EE rates (b) u, v and tightness
Notes: Percentage change relative to steady state for u (black, solid), UE rate (green, long dash), EU
rate (red, medium dash), EE rate (blue, long dash) v (red, long dash),  (blue, short dash).
Figure 9: Low Productivity
equally large increase in the aggregate EU rate, and an even larger increase in unemployment.
The ndings in Figure 7, though, highlight a new set of challenges for the r-shock hypothesis. In a
typical recession, the percentage decline in the UE rate is the approximately the same for younger
and older workers (see the top panel of Figure 8). Moreover, in a typical recession, the EU rate
increases for workers of all ages, and in percentage terms by approximately the same amount (see
the bottom panel of Figure 8). Similar counterfactual predictions of a discount rate shock could
be derived by comparing the response of the UE and EU rates of worker with a high school and
workers with a college degree, who have very di¤erent rates of human capital accumulation but
very similar percentage uctuations in UE and EU rates.
For the sake of comparison, we now compute the response of the labor market to a negative
shock to the aggregate component of productivity. As in Section 3, we assume that the economy
is at the steady state associated with a discount rate r of 4% and an aggregate component of
productivity y equal to 1. We then hit the economy with an unanticipated and permanent negative
shock to the aggregate component of productivity of 5%. Figure 9 shows the response of the
aggregate UE, EU and EE rates to the y-shock (left panel) and the response of the aggregate
unemployment and vacancy rates (right panel). The aggregate UE rate falls by about 7:5%; the
aggregate EU rate increases by 35% on impact and then settles to a level that is 20% higher than
before the shock; the aggregate EE rate falls by 10%. The aggregate unemployment rate increases
by about 20%, while the aggregate vacancy rate falls by about 10%. Figure 10 shows the response
of the UE, EU, EE and unemployment rates by age group. The response of UE, EU, EE and
unemployment rates is very similar across workers of di¤erent ages. The decline in the UE rate is
around 7:5% for workers aged 21-30, 31-40, 41-50 and 51-60. The EU rate increases for workers
in all age groups, although the increase is slightly larger for younger workers than for older ones
(as young workers are more likely to be in marginal matches than older ones).
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(a) Ages 21-30 (b) Ages 31-40
(c) Ages 41-50 (d) Ages 51-60
Notes: Percentage change relative to steady state for u (black, solid), UE rate (green, long dash), EU
rate (red, medium dash), EE rate (blue, short dash) for di¤erent age groups.
Figure 10: Low Productivity by Workers Age
At the aggregate level, the response of the labor market to a negative y-shock is very similar to
the response to a positive r-shock, both with respect to the magnitude of the response of di¤erent
variables and with respect to the comovement of the response of di¤erent variables. Moreover,
the aggregate response of the labor market to both y and r shocks is broadly consistent with the
behavior of the US labor market in a typical recession. At a more disaggregate level, though, the
two shocks have di¤erent implications. A positive r-shock generates labor market responses that
are very heterogeneous across di¤erent age groups, while a negative y-shock generates responses
that are fairly homogeneous across di¤erent age groups. Along this disaggregated dimension, a
negative y-shock performs signicantly better than a positive r-shock.
5 Conclusions
Using a rich search-theoretic model of the labor market in which the UE, EU and EE rates are all
endogenous, we revisited Halls hypothesis that cyclical uctuations in unemployment are caused
by shocks to the rate at which agents discount future income. Analytically, we showed that an
increase in the discount rate not only lowers the UE rate as pointed out by Hall 2017 but
it also lowers the EU rate under some rather natural conditions. Quantitatively, we showed
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that when the model is calibrated to match the average UE, EU and EE rates as well as the
relationship between EU and EE rates and job tenure an increase in the discount rate from 4 to
10% generates a 3.5% decline in the UE rate and a 6% decline in the EU rate. The response of
the unemployment rate is extremely small. These ndings are at odds with the actual behavior of
the US labor market over the business cycle, which features a negative comovement between the
UE and EU rates and large uctuations in the unemployment rate.
We showed that our ndings are robust to alternative versions of our baseline model. Among
the alternative versions that we considered, the most interesting is one in which workers accumulate
human capital on the job (as in Kehoe, Midrigan and Pastorino 2019). We found that, at the
aggregate level, a discount rate shock generates a negative comovement between the UE and the EU
rate and a large increase in the unemployment rate. A discount rate shock, though, still generates
a positive comovement between the UE and EU rate for older workers. Moreover, a discount rate
shock generates much larger responses for young workers whose return to experience is high
than for older workers whose return to experience is close to zero. In contrast, in the US labor
market, the UE and EU rates move against each other for all age groups, and they move by
approximately the same percentage for all age groups.
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